ECONOMICS OF DEFICITS (From the looseness and consumer bliss in the Memorandum and the troika) ----------------------
Since the country joined the EMU in 2001 is becoming an institution to challenge the financial and aggregates of the country after each government change. We saw in 2004 when the government is assumed governance of the country after 8 years Simitis and PASOK government we see in 2009 when the government of George Papandreou was received by the Karamanlis government. The question of financial figures from the government is nothing more than challenge the state machine essentially challengers have shaped the practices and approaches of recent decades. In essence, challenge the flimsy foundation as the politicians themselves have built. The adoption of that is legal is moral, lack of respect for legality, the trick, the technocratic koutoponiries and fictional self that gives the power structure have led to a cloudy environment on public finances. The challenge of 2004. With the takeover by the Karamanlis government in 2004 began an inventory of the Greek economy to determine what the exact situation. The census was done in two stages. The first concerns the audit and the amount of the deficit in 2003. The findings reported in the European statistical office (Eurostat) in April 2004.
According to these deficits in 2003 rose 1.7% to 3.2%, the increase is due to the downward revision of revenue. Eurostat is accepted subject to the revised deficit due to underestimation of the costs of armaments and the lack of reliable information regarding the social security surplus, which ex post was correct and a deficit of 2003 again revised to 4.6%. The second stage of the audit of accounts focused on defense spending and social security surplus. During the census said that the whole process was a deliberate action by the then government to branded the former government, while no excuse for not fulfilling election commitments. Addressing the census was unrealistic criteria and highly populist and demagogic. The revelation of the true financial picture was a necessary condition for the victory of honesty and respect as a beaten track road with its partners in the European Union and globally with the international community. This is because the services of the European Union in early 2002 had sent the message to the then Greek government doubted that the Greek statistics. What was revealed, however, the census? Revealed that systematically hidden costs and are referred to the deficit and debt figures bore no relation to reality. Creative accounting has developed a virtual reality that was far cry from the realities of the Greek economy. The results of the survey made public in late September 2004 by the Statistical Office of the European Union caused an uproar and many were those who asked and even elimination of Greece from the Eurozone. The revelations have shown that the much-strong Greek economy was not nothing but a very troubled economy, which would require serious and strenuous efforts to win the confidence of the international community. The inventory data were revised deficit and debt for the period 2000-2004. The deficit of 2000 levels by 2% to GDP reached 4.1% in 2001 from 1.4% TO 3.7% in 2002 from 1.4% TO 3.7% 2003 by 1.7% TO 4.6% and 1.2% in 2004 reached 5.3%.
The debt of 2000 levels by 106.2% to GDP reached 114% in 2001 from 106.9% to reach 114.7% in 2002 from 104.7% to reach 112.5% of 2003 reached 102.4% and 109.9 in 2004 from 97.7% to reach 112.1%. The increase in debt due to the revision of intragovernmental debt, which occurred less than 3.9 billion € for 2000, € 5 billion for 2001, € 5.3 billion for 2002 and 5.7 billion € for 2003 and rose back obligations in the interest amounts that were capitalized in the past and have not appeared anywhere. The increase in losses due to the downward revision of the surpluses of social security for local authorities and public entities and the actual recording of military spending based on the time their order. Especially in 2004 the deficit increase was due to non-record documents relating to the Olympics, the electoral allowances for the election of March 2004, the compensation plan for the security of the Olympic Games and the implementation costs of the social package Simitis. The reservations Eyrostat for information given to them by the Greek side were considered correct since no record of overall expenditure leading subsequently to multiple revisions. On this basis the final 2001 deficit reached 4.4% in 2002 to 4.8% in 2003 to 5.7% and 7.4% in 2004. Especially the 2004 deficit amounted to 7.4% from 5.3% recorded for expenditure of € 4 billion relating to debts of NHS hospitals. Failure to record the expenditure as a whole was the main reason that the public debt increased disproportionately to the size of government deficit. In light of these developments, the Greek economy came to supervision by the departments of the European Union in February 2005. Despite the Cassandras forecasts focusing on adapting the mild Greek economy returned in the months that followed the path of fiscal orthodoxy with the passport out of the excessive deficit procedure to be given in early June 2007 by the Council of Finance Ministers of the Union. The return of Greece to financial orthodoxy was again a fact.
The decision put an end to all the excessive deficit procedure validates the hard work and labors of the Greek people. Many say that the surveillance was taking charge. As demonstrated by the years end get only the excessive deficit procedure. Supervision will always exist in the sense that the watchful eye of the institutions of the European Commission will always monitor, advise and encourage the Greek government for financial stability guidelines. The challenge of 2009. The decision early elections to address the critical situation of public finances and combat fraud in fact suggest the poor prospects of the Greek economy and the uncertainty of dealing with macroeconomic stability. During the run of the elections on October 4, 2009 the size of government deficit and the amount of debt was converted into a field of hard confrontation. The reason was the constant revisions of the deficit and above the actual figure for the years 2008 and especially 2009. The 2008 deficit was revised 6 times by the end of 2007 and the 2009 deficit was revised 5 times. In 2008 the original deficit target of 1.6% of GDP, 2.3% went to the draft budget, to 2.5% in the 2009 budget to 3.7% with the revision of the Program Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 5% in March 2009, to 5.7% in September 2009 and 7.7% in October 2009. For 2009, the original forecast by the SRS in 2007 was 0.8%, 1.8% went to the draft 2009 budget, 2% of the budget of 2009 to 3.7% with SRS in 2009, 6% in September 2009 and 12.5% in October 2009. But how we got to these levels? Fiscal diversion for 2009 was expected if we consider the international and domestic political-economic environment. The international financial crisis that started in the U.S. in the summer of 2007 would be reasonable to hit the Greek economy in 2008 and 2009. All forecasts in the spring of 2009, the growth rate of our country by creditworthy international organizations are moving between 0.2 and -1.1%, which led to the firm conclusion that Greek economy in 2009 would land at levels unprecedented in the euro. Of course, as in so many issues and the amount of growth was the cause of political and technocratic disputes. The Greek government through the Stability and Growth Programme raised two good versions of 1.1% and 0.5% pessimistic, the Bank of Greece moved to the worst-case scenario levels of government, ie 0.5% and the European Commission moved lower in the range of 0.2%. Whatever the scenario, and if we accept the conclusions we can draw two were first argument that Greece wanted unaffected by the crisis and even shot down a strong way and secondly, the landing of the Greek economy was so violent and extreme surprise. During 2009 and most powerful economies in the world were expected to act amid recession and even depression which is considered the biggest since 1929. Already by the second half of 2008 the strongest economies in the world were in recession fulfilling the technical term he wants negative rates for two consecutive quarters. For our country was an important factor in building the 2009 budget based on optimistic parameters. For example, the elasticity of tax revenue for 2009 was estimated at around 2.25 as the nominal GDP growth estimated at 5.9% while the increase in tax revenue to 13.2%. If you think that over the last decade, tax elasticities not exceed 1.45% then easily conclude that in times of financial crisis and credit levels of elasticity of approximately 2.25 seem unrealistic. As is well known tax elasticity above 1 indicates overtaxation and less than 1 evasion. On this basis, elasticity tax rate of 2.25 showed a tendency of higher rate in time of international recession, unfortunately, the only thing achieved was the 2009 budget to consider the adoption of the unworkable and under review. The review of data the 2009 budget finally came sooner than most analysts had expected through the program update in January 2009. Under this general government deficit would have reached 3.7% of GDP in 2009 to 3.2% in 2010 and 2.6% in 2011. In fact Greece has requested an adjustment period of three years while the European Commission require the deficit over a period of two years.
Despite the fact that Greece was a repeat, although it came out while monitoring the 2006 next year 2007 again exceeded the maximum permissible limit of 3% on its budget deficit and despite the fact that the threshold at years 2007-2008 were not due to the financial crisis hitting the world economy since the summer of 2007, though the severity of the institutions of the eurozone was indicative of the way to be treated by Greece. Perfectly possible to give three years to restore the deficit to acceptable levels after the international trend wants to fiscal expansion as a solution the only way to end the crisis. A country like Greece to participate in the Euro Area's GDP is less than 2% actually could not pose any problem either in euros or in the general character of the association. Also been punished by the markets by increasing both the additional rate and the increase in premiums. The institutions of the eurozone deplete the severity at a time when contractile fiscal policies alone will ultimately be achieved is to have a place in deeper levels of depression. Impression caused by the instigation of the institutions of the eurozone on policies and practices that run against the current era. Certainly the country's problems were not new. In that no one disagreed. It measures brought in full desperation production base in the country could not be recommended as treatment options-fiscal deficits. New taxes in a recession and reducing demand will not fill the coffers of a State contrary to inactivate fully the mechanisms of production of the country resulting in bankruptcies and rising unemployment. In the case of Greece could not spring of 2009 to talk about new taxes from the time we could not collect, nor those who were satisfied in past. According to the Court of the uncollected amounts certified by taxes, fees and other revenue at the end of 2007 amounted to 35 billion € of which lapsed after its € 3.52 billion, the remaining 31.48 billion € was to be recovered. The weakness of tax administration is demonstrated by the fact that uncollected at the end of 2003 amounted to € 11.5 billion which means that the four years 2004-2007 Greece went up by about 174% or 19.98 billion €. The amount of uncollected taxes reached 12.8% of GDP (€ 245.81 billion in 2008).
The amount of uncollected taxes accounted for almost all indirect taxes a year. The tax evasion rampant, as witnessed by the taxes are not paid and as the effects of global crisis hitting the real economy than was unrealistic to talk about new taxes. In the spring of 2009 the situation was four: • Greece in 2008 were on track for Community-based surveillance data of 2007, which was activated in March 2009 when it was found that the deficit in 2008 and 2009 will be above 3%. • The revenue impact of this crisis are moving at a rate of 4% target for 2009 of around 13%. • The deficit in 2008 presented an unprecedented opening of about 5.72 billion €. • Data on production, exports, consumption and employment showed that 2009 was a year of low flight over the years that followed our accession to the Eurozone. Magic solutions do not exist. The requirements imposed seriousness of the times, a review of costs, since for example it was unthinkable OSE day to charge the Greek taxpayer to 3 million. €, with costs that will shape prospects for production and employment in particular change the thinking and action by all partners normal. As mentioned already built when the 2009 budget were two facts: First, the growth of Greek economy landed at levels of stagnation and Secondly, the international financial crisis besieging the Greek real economy. Both these data Alogoskoufis team knew about, but probably having the back of the mind of the prospect of relaxing the Stability and Growth Pact has to write a budget of unreality. There needs to be a financial guru to understand that the changing trend of tax revenue (flexibility) can not be more than double the growth of Gross Domestic Product. Just this fact indicated that the 2009 budget was on the birth of the review.
The striking is that the 2008 budget as presented reveal themselves pathogenesis. According to the accounting data is widening state budget for 2008 due solely to the regular budget and see the progress of disappointing revenue and less spending. The largest losses in revenue are identified by the RTDI and heating oil and two were delayed in their implementation. If we add the reduction in VAT revenue from car registration tax, the corporation tax and real estate transfer tax mercy of the economic slowdown then the shortfall in revenue rightfully stood at 2.3 billion €. That the revenue of the regular budget had increased by 6% against an annual target of 12.2%. In contrast the cost had increased at a rate of 10.3% against an annual target of 5.6% with primary expenditures have increased by 9.3% against a target of 5.2% and interest payments by 14% against a target of 7.2 %. Score the updated Stability and Growth Pact deficit in 2008 to reach 3.7% versus an initial target of 1.5% and 2.5% when the revised 2007 deficit recorded at 3.5%. For 2009 the forecast deficit is like 3.7% versus the original forecast of 2%. The revision of income in 2009 stood at € 2.5 billion and that assuming that the growth was around 1.1% because otherwise the revenue shortfall would be higher since the downturn in economic activity would impact on direct and indirect taxation and non-verification of income from the provision of outstanding tax matters. The unfavorable situation due to the financial crisis provided an easy and painless excuse to cover events for revenue shortfalls, the recent past, however, showed that the problem identified in the income tax. The intensity of the phenomenon was great. The restriction imposed since it would help reduce deficits. The size of the fraud identified by two factors, the probability of discovery of fraud and the amount of the penalty. If the tax collecting mechanism and fiscal controls increase the probability of disclosure of tax evaders and punishment was rational in light of the seriousness of the offense, then things would change dramatically. Further measure to tackle tax evasion is imposed and the deregulation of the completion of pending tax cases with extremely favorable terms for inconsistent taxpayers. Certainly cutting the deficit should be done with the help of expenditure restraint. According to the European Union to lower costs by 30% compared with those making the final impact on the economy would be identical and a number of expenditure is not productive in nature. On this basis, imposed by one side of the rescheduling of expenditure and the other by cutting waste. Experience had shown that fiscal adjustment is sustainable is not enough data on revenue measures. Improving the financial situation takes place only through the permanent retention of primary spending. According to the Bank of Greece as a principal measure to control and reduce costs is the introduction of numerical fiscal rules on the amount (either in absolute terms or relative to GDP) or rate increase. Such rules shall specify the amount of the costs not only for the narrow public sector but also the essential elements of government such as hospitals, local authorities, universities, etc., and will clearly define the entity or person who has the full and exclusive responsibility. In fact talking about an internal Stability and Growth Pact, since it is inconceivable that Greece as a country as a whole, committed to certain things with the European Union and various subsets of arbitrary and to operate without rules. It is inconceivable that the central government struggles to reduce budget deficits and areas such as local government to act without barriers, creating deficits for which no one today is not able to determine with precision. Apart from the level of deficits in the run of the elections of October 4, 2009 to address tax evasion has become a priority issue for the parties in power. Tackling tax evasion was in the pre-election programs of all political parties in power in recent decades. And tackling fraud alleged by the then prime minister went on to call early Election wanted to highlight a major problem not only of the Greek economy and society in general. Rightly so, because, as revealed by the European Commission and the increase in the deficit of 2009 is the 1 / 3 the effects of the crisis in 1 / 3 of the hidden debts and at 1 / 3 of the collapse of the tax administration. That tax evasion is gangrene in our economy for decades, as well as reality is the pathologies observed and recorded in the tax collecting mechanisms and for decades the official state unable to cope with a drastic way. Review our cause was in early summer 2009, the report by former economy minister Alogoskoufis in an interview that "I personally think every minister felt powerless in front of tax collecting mechanisms that have cross-party nature and need for bipartisan consensus on address them. If the Minister feels weak in front of the power of tax administration, where any attempt to address the suspicious activities of these mechanisms white faces strikes by workers in those resulting in immediate easing of revenues, when every effort intensification of controls leading to further strengthening aftoploutismou means of tax collection teams you can not expect much from the vague promise to fight tax evasion. If not cleared by the manure of Augeias if revenue collection mechanisms of the state is not made aware of any impartial government official tax policy will have no effect. Before the policy imposed by the compensation scale values for those who deal with the application. Currently the devices are picture sieve where large mass of taxable property escapes at bargain basement controllers and controlled only winners auditors aftoploutizoun against the general interest. It is therefore necessary to restructure the tax administration. Restructuring thorough but not superficial as is done periodically in recent decades. It is better to demolish the existing system and totally corrupt, even by accepting the collapse of revenue for a couple of years than to proceed with half-measures strouthokamilizontas to renew the existing rotten scheme. It is preferable to intentionally experience a collapse in revenue by solving an effective and credible manner the problem of recovery mechanisms rather than to experience the way of previous years which is always the solution, was the imposition of new taxes and the intensification of corrupt audits. How necessary is a fundamental recasting of the tax administration is illustrated by the fact that although the tax rates for businesses and middle income fell by ten percentage points of revenue from direct taxes as a percentage of GDP has not fallen at all. In essence it shows that when crossing the computerization and the objectification of controls in a manner transparent to taxable item does not require high rates. Why failed efforts in controlling the deficit? The impact of the financial crisis got size and increased in the last quarter of 2008. Until then only the increase in oil prices and raw materials as troubled in the first three quarters the growth of Greek economy remained strong. On an annual basis GDP grew by 3.6% in the second quarter and by 3.1% in third quarter versus the euro-zone growth of 1.4% and 0.8% respectively. On this basis we enter the budget for 2009 with growth of 2.7% and a deficit of 2.5%. The escalating crisis in the last quarter of 2008 dramatically changed the data. The solvency problems of financial institutions, the concern for deposits, reducing the confidence of investors and consumers, increasing uncertainty and the international trend to support the real economy gave the position of the new situation. The central bank lowered interest rates and increased liquidity and national governments as well as the Greek agreed at EU level in October 2008 on the guarantee of deposits, increased liquidity in securing funding to maintain confidence in the banking system and to protect vulnerable groups and borrowers.
The result of all this increased spending, and of course the main reason for the decline in revenues due to the low flight of the economy soaring deficits was the natural consequence. The speed of the hard facts and reality led to a continuous downward revision of GDP. The revised GDP in 2008 and 6 times the original 4% occurred in the stabilization and development in 2007 reached the 2% in September 2009. The GDP of 2009 until the October 2009 revised 7 times from the original 4% displayed in the Stabilization and Development of 2007 arrived at a negative -1.5%. With the stabilization program and Development of 2009 in January 2009 the then government understood that the 2009 budget had no luck smooth implementation. The negative situation imposed corrective actions. The first was in mid-March 2009. Established extraordinary one-off tool 300-500 € for low and low income, impose an extraordinary contribution to revenues of over 60.000 € in the range of 1.000-5.000 €, imposed 5% to your base salary of parliamentarians, fixed cap on recruitment to the amount of 12,000 , have developed a new framework for recovery of arrears and become more rigorous control of expenditure. At the same time made great efforts to support the real economy through programs related to sectors of the economy went bad times, such as SMEs, tourism, farmers, construction, the automotive market and exports. We should not be escaping the fact that implementation of major infrastructure projects worth 19 billion € with simultaneous new investments in the private and public enterprises that made use of private capital 5.7 billion €. In June it became apparent that new measures were required. The new package of measures expected revenue 1.9 billion €, with increases in the price of petrol increased by 10% taxes on mobile telephony, with a single fee for car owners over 1990 cc and owners of yachts, with road tax holders vessels, removing the tax-free lotteries in the regularization of the semi-open spaces and new fees on the basis of old cars. The Treasury estimated that the measures would help increase public revenue by 0.8% of GDP, which in combined with revenue growth of 0.2% of GDP that came from fighting tax evasion would keep the 2009 deficit at around 3.7% of GDP. On the basis of budget execution for the first half of 2009 shows that no measure could halt the financial diversion. The first half of 2009 the budget deficit stood at € 17.48 billion or 7.3% of GDP. At the same time the primary deficit reached 4.5% of GDP four times higher than in 2008 to 1.2%. The increase in the deficit came in 56.9% of the regular budget and 43.1% from the public investment budget.
STATE BUDGET DEFICIT % YEAR
2004 7,4
2005 5,2
2006 2,9
2007 3,7
2008 7,7
2009 12,7
The base was also expected to increase its annual lending of 40 billion originally estimated to be € 56 billion in October and approximately € 70 billion at the end of 2009. Given that the domestic product shrinking for first time since 1993 which would have a strong impact on tax revenues, given that the global crisis had hit its strongest domestic industries, tourism and shipping, given that domestic demand and mechanism to support the bank loans were limited, given that foroeisprachtikoi mechanisms are insolvent, given that the establishment of a mechanism for charging the RTDI was harder than expected, given that within the political support liquidity accelerated VAT refunds and Given that there was excess expenditure of both the regular budget and public investment through accelerated disbursements for public works, budget diversion would not be unprecedented in modern history. The diversion led financial and domestic political climate in two elections (June 7 elections and national October 4th), unstable government majority, retractions the precise definition of national elections and the dismantling of public services. Just how influenced the economy, dismantling the state apparatus from the ugly political and electoral climate appeared in late October 2009 when it published the execution of the budget for the 8-month January to August 2009. There were astronomical variations in 8-month deficit of about € 20.9 billion versus € 11.2 billion in the corresponding period of 2008, for a total of SRS -2009 forecasting a deficit of around 12.7 billion €. The hole reached the € 8 billion by reducing revenue by 3.5% against a target increase of 14.8% and 13.6% over expenditure against a target of 9.7%. On this basis, the data sent by the newly elected government in Brussels led the deficit to 12.5% in 2009 and 7.7% for 2008. Eurostat is accepted subject to the revised deficit of both the 2008 and 2009, as indeed he had done to the census of 2004 due to lack of reliable information regarding the proskomizome data. As had happened in 2004 so the 2009 census must expect new revisions of both deficits and debt and this debt because the public hospitals amounting to 6 billion €, with pharmaceutical companies 2.68 billion €, with construction 2,5 € companies and to individuals by tax return EUR 3 billion €, ie debts totaling 14.18 billion € do not know how much appear to parousiazomenous accounts. A cynical tackle the whole situation will be reflected in the following sentence: since 2004 with a growth rate of 4.6% deficit reached 7.4% in 2009 because the rate of negative 1.5% deficit is not more than twice? However many times is the legitimate and ethical public finances should record the financial statement is accurate for each period of government. Censuses may be imposed for political reasons but in any case the financial inconsistency, the waste and inefficiency in resource management should be assigned to those responsible for any diversion. It is unacceptable spending accounted lag months or even years, and the European Union to turn a blind eye. For the unreliability of the accounts blame the Union's institutions to tolerate situations that are not establish specific time frame capture and each time merely to verbal reprimands. The inconsistency and koutoponiria is equivalent to the intent we must be punished severely. In summary we can say that the 2004 census and the census of 2009 was necessary since the systematic recording of all expenditure should be reflected in public accounts. In addition to restoring the credibility of statistical data abroad is a cornerstone of the image must follow the Greek economy if we want to win the respect of our partners in international organizations. From the mild to moderate adjustment. If we take seriously that the firing of the deficit in 2009 is the 1 / 3 to the international crisis and its implications, in 1 / 3 to the collapse of the tax administration and 1 / 3 act in secret, then the return to budgetary orthodoxy passes through the parameters we already know. In the economy there are no magic solutions or political magicians. There are good politicians with a high sense of responsibility and technocratic options to help fiscal consolidation. In 2004, the adjustment took the adjective soft, while the 2009 adaptation is closer to the adjective rational. In fact both adjustments starting from the same position before having exhausted their right to determine the deficits of previous years in a way that suits their strategy. In 2004 and 2009, costs, and outstanding obligations from previous years are entered in the years created, ie before leaving the field clear for the future. This practice may be imposed for political reasons but it is absolutely right because the accounting treatment should reflect the different time and place agreed costs. Because the costs of the 2004 Olympic Games, the debts of the hospitals, the social costs of pre-election package, costs related to the elections, etc to eterochronisthoun were levied subsequent budgets? Because in 2009 the costs related to back taxes from the tax on heating oil costs were debts to pharmaceutical and manufacturing companies, costs related debts hospitals, etc to eterochronisthoun were levied subsequent budgets? This must be legitimate and moral thrilled and registration must be on time. Apart from the performance activity at the time, bloating the deficits of previous years, gives the possibility of soft and affordable forms of adaptation. By swell the deficit mainly by non-recurring costs of the return to lower levels of deficit is more easily and painlessly. For example, the 2004 costs inflated the deficit to 7.4% from levels of 1.2% in the 2004 budget originally recorded owe largely to non-recurring costs such as debts to the hospitals of 4 billion € provided additional impetus 2 percentage points in the deficit or expenditure of the Olympic Games that were not recorded. On this basis, it was evident that the decline in the deficit at around 5.2% in 2005 will take place without any particular difficulty and without taking painful measures. The further decline in the deficit in 2006 at levels of 2.9% could be achieved by gently without any social tension and especially without any political cost. The 2009 costs boosted the deficit levels by 3.7% set by the revised Stability and Growth in the levels of 12.7% due largely to expenses to third parties of over € 14 billion in costs due to address the impact of international crisis. It is therefore expected to be quite effortlessly drop in the deficit by 4 to 5 percentage points since 2010 and not as it wants the Bank of the years 2010-2011. From the moment but there will be depletion of non-recurring costs, then the hard core deficits require adjustment want to drop a unit equal to 2.5 billion €. With a moderate approach to deficit reduction can be done without spilling blood and without friction with the social partners. If adopted as a strategy for further deficit reduction strategy that wants the fiscal adjustment come in 2 / 3 side reduction and rationalization of expenditures and in 1 / 3 of revenue growth by tackling tax evasion and widening the tax base, then maybe the adjustment and return to financial orthodoxy is durable and stable. For the story to mention that on April 22, 2010, the European Statistical Office - Eurostat-reviewed data in both the public deficit and public debt in 2009. So the deficit levels by 12.7% went to the level of 13.6%, while debt levels by 113.4% went to the level of 115.1% to GDP. The striking is that neither this review for the year is the last because, according to Eurostat scenario the government deficit is expected to reach 14.1% and public debt at 122% of GDP and this because there is uncertainty about the famous white hole surplus insurance funds for 2009, there are doubts about the classification (public or private) of certain public corporations with deficits, and there is no record of the swaps market in 2001 because the information provided on only swaps in 2008. How are revisions to the statistics of the country affect the reliability shown by the direct impact on markets. Specifically on the day of the last review the spread of Greek 10-year bond for the first time surpassed the 600 bp while yields reached 9.13%. At the same time the risk premium famous CDS exceeded even the Ukraine reaching 565 points. Meanwhile, the international rating agency Moody's downgraded the credit rating of A3 country level was the lowest rung of the first category while stating that there will be continuity in the credit rating downgrades.
LEKKAS SARANTOS
Economist
